110: NEFX - Hobiogenactic

NEFX - Bumpenons.txt ? The truths of those last two sentences goes to show the meta-character and meta-importance of the universal principle in the first place, both regarding its nature and the form of its valid expression. ? But many thoughts and expressions throughout the ages may express, at least in aggregate, a hitherto inchoate truth whose concise expression, categorization, and formulization gives it life. ? The mere acknowledgement and understanding of reasoning being discoverable in all things can cultivate and galvanize more advanced thought and expression thereof for truth. ? Moreover, it must be delineated in its common application across these different things and the particulars regarding each of them. ? To show this, the process must be precisely delineated, especially to prove its own logic for the phenomena or specific sciences it is meant to apply to. ? The consistent process and use of such principle across different contexts as may not have even been known to the other (concerning the beings involved in any of them) may gain it further validity, especially the more specific and complex such principle is shown to be. ? For that matter, the validity of a principle (especially regarding reason) can be shown to a degree by how it has factored into discoveries of truth as of yet, even if in a manner hitherto (at least concerning beings at large) unconscious or less conscious — for even where it may be inapplicable to a possible context (such as, say, in the future), it remains a way by which to discover the precise contours and boundaries of truth and that method thereto. ? This very right itself bespeaks of the validity of being-as-such, regardless of the actual found and proven reason (whether yet existing even in collective thought of beings or lying nestled somewhere in the future). ? Nevertheless, given again the moral limitations of thought and the self-obligations of beings to their own being (or being as such), beings are both to some degree bound and with right to wagers on the validity of things such as their being as such, and the fight they make in the world-as-known for its sake and thus their own sake. ? The mere exercise and cultivation of thought and its necessary processes itself can bespeak of truth on some level, though it is not sufficient for the actual truth of whatever all content is being expressed thereby. ? The cultivation of habit of particularization can help the thinker in taking to the former action effectively and avoiding the latter action. ? Here, then, views are best formed by the breaking down of processes and the mental deriving of effects from causes, conclusions from premises, rather than by the formation of such conclusions or causes first and then the formulation of effects or premises which lead to them; but what in theory is the former cause may not account for a fundamental misunderstanding on part of the thinker, and it is easy to justify what is in fact the latter approach by stating it to be the former merely by the fact that it is “harsh” or would not be stated in all its supposed honestly but for its very severity, leading to a trend among vendors of our Blightgeist of "truth by severity”. ? In a way, true recognition of their unity consists in the understanding of their particularity firstly as separate, then as regards the exact system of their interconnections, separate from the category often imposed post-hoc (and often historically with less aggregate understanding among beings) by which they are thereafter commonly only loosely known at most. ? It is also paradoxically by this particularization that the precise uniting aspects of various things are more discovered and understood innately rather than just nominally or culturally (especially as regards societally-imposed duty). ? In any case, content which even drives at probing and elucidating the particularities of things and of reality as opposed to generalization is the basis of much rigorous understanding, in a way which paradoxically (even if just by sheer difficulty of logistics) confounds common understanding itself. ? Ire over subjectively unclear or arrogant expressions within such content are disingenuous when they come from those whose system of thought is predicated against being as such, for whom the imagined audience under attack in the former thinker is merely the latter's own chosen fiefdom of “innately worthy" beings. ? Besides this, given the inherent limits of mortal thought even at its maximum yet achieved, expressions even of confusion are inevitable and even necessary insofar as they are a form of humility and awareness on part of the thinker, and may furnish future thinkers with the means to better feel out the contour and boundary of truth by the precise ways in which the (theoretically) fallacious or "superfluous" text or form of content can be said to err. ? The ultimate judge of such expressions and content is universality itself, which thought is necessarily in communion with, and its ultimate record is the akashic one, beyond any (successful or not) long-term content storage solution beings have yet cooked up. ? Expression of thought in general — especially in non-finite, non-imposing resources as would not hinder or even threaten beings as such — is only a net positive, and its relative comprehensibility (which is again subjective and beholden to the same folly of disconnection underlined above) does not necessarily reflect either its depth or lucidity. ? The question is also not to be taken likely as to whether comprehension of thoughts or concepts as must inevitably be expressed in great length and detail can truly be said to reflect upon the expresser's credibility — for it is perhaps a better question to ask whether vacuum would be more helpful than the existence of said expression at all, even if the latter were only to serve as a case study in possible forms, methods, factors, and even follies of thought. ? By the same token, it behooves beings at large to consider the ways in which circumstance at least makes things appear as though such exercise of particularization is impractical for beings’ more immediate concerns, and the ways that exercises of particularization may not truly get at the thing (at least for outside parties per se) so much as be an exercise in ego or frivolity. ? Therefore, the uniting principle of disunity (both as regards universal principle and personal duty) taken to be true behooves the thinker to investigate and properly specify as regards each thing how the principle applies to it in its own particular way. ? It is perhaps paradoxically by the uniting of different concerns under this principle that their very rash categorization together may be avoided, but beings are nonetheless bound by time, circumstance, and (however provisional) necessity, or at least their perception of these three things, in their concern for how deeply and nuancedly to categorize, render as particular, and investigate various concepts and phenomena in all their minutiae, let alone to an end of ultimate or universal concern rather than to another one of more immediate and provisional necessity within the bounds laid by their conditions (often societally imposed). ? This is all the more challenging and essential and yet more fruitful regarding those fields of thought which are more general and all-encompassing, and whence other fields of thought may (however subconsciously) derive their truth. ? To this end, even the temporary suspension of an umbrella category for things which may be (even commonly) categorized thus can be helpful for properly investigating the things up until the point at which it seems impossible even in absolute principle not to so unite them; by which point the reasoning and purpose behind their uniting can be more clearly understood. ? What's clear enough is that, at least on an individual basis (regarding the serving of that very individual), increasing particularization of things is the more fortuitous of two limited approaches, even where the logistics of spreading and educating on such system would be highly impractical; and this can even motivate individuals towards the further investigation of things and investigation itself for the want of further particularization of things and thus more definitely organized understanding. ? Here we find a new dilemma where, aside from the aforementioned consequences of increasingly narrow categorization, one is also faced with those of conflating or overly homogenizing, and we are set about the task of determining the methods and degrees of categorization regarding what, or what would be entailed in the transcendence of even the need of such a system. ? Such concepts, even where nominally remembered on a collective or cultural level, become all the more inscrutable upon further investigation as regards even their initial and more limited-in-potential understanding, as if now mere empty signifiers upon which beings’ conception of life and reality (be they often banal) are built; and thus the particular are forgotten or loosely conflated in a general category without sufficient distinctions and their according ramifications, importance, and roots of mental conception. ? Such context may both furnish us with new and possibly better means of grappling with such concepts and yet be one of further disconnection from the impetus to, and even cultivated consciousness of, that very concept (which can be ironic given the latter’s contribution to different good present conditions), and so beings must ever ask how such principles can be used in their present context. ? Given the aforementioned separation of our current context (whichever "our" or “we” applies) from that of the aforementioned luminaries and their concepts, universally correct or not, it bears asking how such could be grappled with today given the particular context, conditions, and cultural accumulations and conditionings that we are (to a degree) bound to. ? Vaunted luminaries of the ages have brightly and courageously grappled with these core concepts while seldom being able to escape such dilemma even where they admit to it, for such admittances themselves are ironically beholden to the same dilemma in the first place; and through their various expressions and discoveries it remains questionable whether the identified aspects of things insofar as we conceive of them lies in the same universal concept, reality, or even thought as our own thoughts do, or rather whether such thoughts of ours are essentially mute to universal reality and the various phenomena within it, as well as where the meeting points of perception and absolute reality may be found and why. ? So in this way these categorized things can be more accurately arrayed within a hierarchy of whichever other category through time (namely, evolutionary line, utility, sequential process, etc), and yet beings’ duty to beings behooves it to be more proactive, conscientious, and assiduous about such classification in advance — even if merely for the aforementioned reason of the cumulative and hardening effect of long-term, inter-generational cultural conditioning, and on the other end a growing tendency towards overly broad and inadequately arrayed classification of things in a general category that does not speak to their role and interrelation. ? Processes of categorization itself, though perhaps tentative in intent or effectiveness, may nonetheless serve as starting points by which to arrive at truth, to be ultimately discarded (or, what's more, transcended) at certain thresholds of comprehension and yet ultimately as necessary to the whole process as, say, a bud to a blossom; for it is partly by this process that the precise contour and boundary of truth is found, whether in its ultimate (as can be as-yet conceived) form or as regards the current threshold or plateau of understanding in question that may yet stand to be totally contradicted by a future or even very next one. ? It bears questioning whether such methods as this can be considered the ultimate form of reasoning even where they may be a key aspect of it, given both that categorization (especially as is culturally pressured and conditioned) is limited and can unto itself funnel consciousness (especially that of those beings uninvolved or disconnected in some way regarding its creation) so as to further limit it over the long term even where it is for the meantime provisionally necessary or expedient; but it can nonetheless remain in service of the transcendental, even if unto itself it may not be so but rather the process of arriving at it (which raises the question of to what degree transcendence lies precisely in action and process rather than as, say, a discretely separate domain requiring a precise process to reach and theoretically permanently abide in at all). ? Moreover, such practice clues the thinker in to concepts that while seemingly basic and self-evident bear conscious acknowledgment and investigation, such as those regarding the homogenous or the particular, and that these should be so distinguished in the first place; and the increasingly broadened or narrow ways in which the homogenous or particular be categorized within others of the same, and this be both accurately drawn back to, and comprehended in their individual and interrelating nature for the most ultimate conception beings can yet muster. ? Nonetheless, in truly analyzing such luminaries as may appear at least outwardly to be far apart in context, lifetime, thoughtform, and other traits, one may gain a better understanding of each of them precisely by such synthesis in the way that the precise boundaries and contours of their thought are determined by where the other differs; and though this could not be the source of absolute truth, the faculties, thoughtforms, and general principles cultivated in such exercise can furnish the thinker with means to better grapple with other concepts and phenomenon later, and fruitfully create and act thereby. ? Vaunted luminaries of the ages, though their cultural pre-eminence may be questionable as regards the motivations and resources behind their disproportionate promotion, may inadvertently unite even lifetimes apart through their synthesis by a student of each, even though all involved parties may be disconnected from the context, impetus, and unspoken (if not subconscious) givens and subtexts to the content of each; and each new thinker grappling with such thinkers, with all the attendant weight of the latter’s accumulation, cultural pressure towards thinking thereabout, and increasing divergence from them as regards the aforementioned dilemma, must paradoxically hold to the faith of their own particular vision, analysis, and possible synthesis of their mental forebears, while realizing that they are a but a brick in a wall of the similarly motivated, whose eventual far reach is so unlikely and preciously contingent and yet nonetheless still questionable even then.