terminal 0
unfinished
NEFX - Role_of_Social_and_Actual_Truth_and_Portrayal_of_Grand_Conflicts Are moral portrayals in framing or even coordination of historical conflict derived from the observed pre-active temperament of the involved parties, even if just in contrast or relation to each other or in a false dichotomy wherein said parties (generally two in an easily digestible moral dualism) are rounded to their closest of extremes of framer-conceived being in a perhaps misguided attempt to frame reality as coherently as they can muster? Or is it the other way around, that stances more inculcate temperaments in their practitioners? Malice and wrong can indeed wreak damage on the practitioner, often out of the expectation of eventual payoff; yet also the seeming immediacy of good, be it derived from that aforementioned contrast where an incomplete structural functionality gains its appealing validity precisely by societally-ordained and general affective functionality in contrast with the apparent suffering of an Other. Nevertheless, affect is felt in the pursuit of an eventual moral end which if not ultimately (however pathologically) vengeful is at least protective in intention, whether against further indignity by an outside menace or assailant, or against potential future threats. In theory either stance intends to communicate, but the nature of this differs. The dissemination of truth, however conceived or constituted, is the side on which positive will errs — an urge to shine light on shadow — yet which ironically must be represented and compromised according to the structural societal obstacles installed by forces withholding of truth at the core; and the subject in question must navigate the complexities of this rigidly enforced, habitual yet ever-evolving system. What’s more, the truth-teller’s key value of being-as-such — which includes for themselves in the iron grip of self-preserving instinct against outside threats and yet by its own selflessness also obliges them to continued being that they may serve being itself (and, for that matter flourishing) of other beings — they are the more condemned not only to lose battles in eventual global resolution, but also to not realize (at least at first) that they will lose or that they have a duty and process to avoid losing, and, more to the point, win and thereby continuing to serve and abide by being-as-such and truth. But truth must also be for more (however implicitly) than just affect (however explicitly), let alone grievance, concerning the thing about which truth is sought or asserted. By contrast, absence of portrayed (at least as seen through the lens of cultural conditioning) affect does not yield validity by contrast or really at all; for such portrayal if not already strategic can still bespeak of a general inner void of thought or life as pat of the dark bargain made in Erosive mentality, which stymies thought and feeling.